Constitutional Verbosity and Social Trust

Christian Bjørnskov; Stefan Voigt

doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0129-z

Constitutional Verbosity and Social Trust

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.

Original language	English
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	161
Issue	1-2
Pages (from-to)	91-112
Number of pages	22
ISSN	0048-5829
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0129-z
Publication status	Published - 2014

Keywords

Constitutional policy economy
Social trust

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10.1007/s11127-013-0129-z

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title = "Constitutional Verbosity and Social Trust",

abstract = "A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries{\textquoteright} constitutions.",

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AU - Bjørnskov, Christian

AU - Voigt, Stefan

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N2 - A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.

AB - A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.

KW - Constitutional policy economy

KW - Social trust

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-013-0129-z

DO - 10.1007/s11127-013-0129-z

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0048-5829

VL - 161

SP - 91

EP - 112

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

IS - 1-2

ER -

Constitutional Verbosity and Social Trust

Abstract

Keywords

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