Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

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The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

Original languageEnglish
Article number23
JournalA C M Transactions on Economics and Computation
Pages (from-to)23:1-23:24
Number of pages24
Publication statusPublished - 22 Dec 2017

    Research areas

  • Algorithmic game theory, Extensive-form correlated equilibrium, Extensive-form games, Finite sequential games, Stackelberg equilibrium, COMPLEXITY, Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium, extensive-form games, stackelberg equilibrium, finite sequential games

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