Department of Economics and Business Economics

Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. / He, Alex Xi; Kennes, John; le Maire, Daniel.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2018.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

He, AX, Kennes, J & le Maire, D 2018 'Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

He, A. X., Kennes, J., & le Maire, D. (2018). Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. Economics Working Papers, No. 2018-10

CBE

He AX, Kennes J, le Maire D. 2018. Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

He, Alex Xi, John Kennes and Daniel le Maire Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. (Economics Working Papers; Journal number 2018-10). 2018., 63 p.

Vancouver

He AX, Kennes J, le Maire D. Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2018 Dec 3.

Author

He, Alex Xi ; Kennes, John ; le Maire, Daniel. / Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2018. (Economics Working Papers; No. 2018-10).

Bibtex

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title = "Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills",
abstract = "We use a directed search model to develop estimation procedures for the identification of worker and rm rankings from labor market data. These methods allow for a general specication of production complementarities and the possibility that higher ranked workers are not more productive in all firms. We also offer conditions for a positive/negative assortative matching that incorporate the possibility of a stochastic job ladder with on-the-job search. Numerical simulations relate the implications of the model to the implications of fixed effect regressions and give further insights into the performance of our estimation procedures. Finally, we evaluate evidence for Denmark using our methods and we show that workers are highly sorted and that higher type workers are less productive than lower type workers while employed in lower type jobs.",
keywords = "Directed search, sorting, wage dynamics, auctions",
author = "He, {Alex Xi} and John Kennes and {le Maire}, Daniel",
year = "2018",
month = "12",
day = "3",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers",
number = "2018-10",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills

AU - He, Alex Xi

AU - Kennes, John

AU - le Maire, Daniel

PY - 2018/12/3

Y1 - 2018/12/3

N2 - We use a directed search model to develop estimation procedures for the identification of worker and rm rankings from labor market data. These methods allow for a general specication of production complementarities and the possibility that higher ranked workers are not more productive in all firms. We also offer conditions for a positive/negative assortative matching that incorporate the possibility of a stochastic job ladder with on-the-job search. Numerical simulations relate the implications of the model to the implications of fixed effect regressions and give further insights into the performance of our estimation procedures. Finally, we evaluate evidence for Denmark using our methods and we show that workers are highly sorted and that higher type workers are less productive than lower type workers while employed in lower type jobs.

AB - We use a directed search model to develop estimation procedures for the identification of worker and rm rankings from labor market data. These methods allow for a general specication of production complementarities and the possibility that higher ranked workers are not more productive in all firms. We also offer conditions for a positive/negative assortative matching that incorporate the possibility of a stochastic job ladder with on-the-job search. Numerical simulations relate the implications of the model to the implications of fixed effect regressions and give further insights into the performance of our estimation procedures. Finally, we evaluate evidence for Denmark using our methods and we show that workers are highly sorted and that higher type workers are less productive than lower type workers while employed in lower type jobs.

KW - Directed search, sorting, wage dynamics, auctions

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers

BT - Complementarity and Advantage in the Competing Auctions of Skills

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -