Department of Economics and Business Economics

Commitment to self-rewards

Research output: Working paperResearch

  • School of Economics and Management
People often overcome self-control problems by promising to reward themselves for accomplishing a task. Such strategies based on self-administered rewards however require the person to believe that she would indeed deny herself the reward if she should fail to achieve the desired outcome. Drawing on Koszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of endogenous reference point formation, we show how a rational forward-looking individual can achieve such internal commitment. But our results also demonstrate the limitations of self regulation based on self-rewards.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationBonn
PublisherInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2009

    Research areas

  • Self control, Motivation, Self reinforcement, Time inconsistency, Referencedependent preferences

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ID: 15143141