Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU

TY - JOUR

T1 - Codecision in context

T2 - implications for the balance of power in the EU

AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Mayer, Alexander

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - The paper analyzes the European Union’s codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU’s wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision rule is robust to adding ‘context’ to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated.

AB - The paper analyzes the European Union’s codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU’s wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision rule is robust to adding ‘context’ to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated.

KW - C70

KW - D72

KW - D78

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84954390411&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-015-0910-7

DO - 10.1007/s00355-015-0910-7

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84954390411

SN - 0176-1714

VL - 46

SP - 213

EP - 237

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

IS - 1

ER -