Department of Economics and Business Economics

Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets

Research output: Working paperResearch

Documents

  • Wp12 09

    Submitted manuscript, 538 KB, PDF document

  • Daniel Monte, Denmark
  • Norovsambuu Tumennasan, Denmark
The problem of allocating indivisible objects to different agents, where each indi
vidual is assigned at most one object, has been widely studied. Pápai (2000) shows that the set of strategy-proof, nonbossy, Pareto optimal and reallocation-proof rules are hierarchical exchange rules | generalizations of Gale's Top Trading Cycles mechanism. We study the centralized allocation that takes place in multiple markets. For example, the assignment of multiple types of indivisible objects; or the assignment of objects in successive periods. We show that the set of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nonbossy rules are sequential dictatorships, a special case of Pápai's hierarchical exchange rules.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationAarhus
PublisherInstitut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet
Number of pages24
Publication statusPublished - 10 May 2012

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