Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

    Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

    Abstract

    This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a suffcient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.
    Translated title of the contributionCartel Stability and Economic Integration
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Keywords

    • trade liberalisation
    • colussion

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