Aarhus University Seal / Aarhus Universitets segl

Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

This paper revisits the notion that economic integration - modeled as a reduction of trade costs - may be anti-competitive, in the sense that it may reinforce the ability of an international cartel to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper is novel in terms of introducing ad valorem and fixed trade costs in addition to the customary unit trade costs. It is shown that an anti-competitive effect, found for reductions in unit trade costs, may disappear once trade costs are ad valorem or fixed.
Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of International Economics
Volume15
Issue2
Pages (from-to)313-320
ISSN0965-7576
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

See relations at Aarhus University Citationformats

ID: 32345282