Department of Economics and Business Economics

Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Standard

Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. / Andersen, Torben M.; Svarer, Michael.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2010.

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Harvard

Andersen, TM & Svarer, M 2010 'Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

Andersen, T. M., & Svarer, M. (2010). Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

CBE

Andersen TM, Svarer M. 2010. Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

Andersen, Torben M. and Michael Svarer Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2010., 37 p.

Vancouver

Andersen TM, Svarer M. Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2010.

Author

Andersen, Torben M. ; Svarer, Michael. / Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2010.

Bibtex

@techreport{477d2d80c0af11df8cb9000ea68e967b,
title = "Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance",
abstract = "The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between {"}good{"} and {"}bad{"} states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.",
keywords = "Unemployment benefits, business cycle, insurance, incentives",
author = "Andersen, {Torben M.} and Michael Svarer",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance

AU - Andersen, Torben M.

AU - Svarer, Michael

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between "good" and "bad" states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.

AB - The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between "good" and "bad" states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.

KW - Unemployment benefits, business cycle, insurance, incentives

M3 - Working paper

BT - Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -