Department of Economics and Business Economics

Bidding for teams

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  • Benoit Julien, UNSW Business School
  • ,
  • John Kennes
  • Moritz Ritter, Temple University

We develop a simple competing job auction model to study wages and employment within teams. If synergies favor larger teams, the basic competing job auction model predicts that workers are generally paid a wage less than their marginal product of labor and that there is too much entry of firms. We then extend the model to allow for workplace competition. In this case, the firms can also compete by a commitment to job amenities and a minimum scale of operation. We then find that wages are always equal to the marginal product of labor and entry of firms is efficient.

Original languageEnglish
JournalLabour Economics
Pages (from-to)68-73
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2018

    Research areas

  • Competing auctions, Directed search, Team production

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