Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of inflows of foreign aid on the debt repayment behaviour of developing countries. The paper first delineates the overall incentives to committing to timely repayment in a war of attrition-type model. A set of panel estimates including 93 developing countries shows that foreign aid is strongly negatively associated with repayment incentives. The findings pertain to both total debt service and service on publically guaranteed debt. Only countries that tend to vote predominantly with the US in the UN General Assembly are not significantly discouraged from servicing their debt by inflows of foreign aid.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of publication | Aarhus |
| Publisher | Aarhus School of Business |
| Number of pages | 48 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9788778825148 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9788778825155 |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Keywords
- Foreign aid
- External debt
- Debt servoce
- Political economy