Aesthetic Perception as Vision for Appearance - On Husserl's Theory of Depiction

TY - CHAP

T1 - Aesthetic Perception as Vision for Appearance - On Husserl's Theory of Depiction

AU - Bundgaard, Peer

PY - 2023/1/1

Y1 - 2023/1/1

N2 - To Husserl, aesthetic image seeing is a subtype of plain image seeing. It is therefore also a perceptual act that reflects the tripartite structure of its object: the image as a physical thing, the image as the image subject it represents, and the image as the depicting surface in virtue of which we have access to the image subject. In this chapter, I will first examine key components of image seeing as such, namely the experienced “conflict” between, on the one hand, the depicting surface and the image thing, and, on the other, the conflict between the depicting surface and the image subject. The latter relation will be redescribed as a perceptual simulation of the image subject elicited by the depicting surface. Contrary to ordinary image seeing, aesthetic perception is, according to Husserl, characterized by an accrued “interest” or “delight in the appearance,” i.e., enhanced attention to the depicting surface. In the second part of the chapter, I will then, by means of examples, lay bare some essential properties of the depicting surface, which specifically inform aesthetic perception, and which belong to appearance proper and not to what appears. Finally, I will show the relevance of Husserl’s analysis for more recent discussions of depiction, revolving around Wollheim’s notion of “twofoldness.”.

AB - To Husserl, aesthetic image seeing is a subtype of plain image seeing. It is therefore also a perceptual act that reflects the tripartite structure of its object: the image as a physical thing, the image as the image subject it represents, and the image as the depicting surface in virtue of which we have access to the image subject. In this chapter, I will first examine key components of image seeing as such, namely the experienced “conflict” between, on the one hand, the depicting surface and the image thing, and, on the other, the conflict between the depicting surface and the image subject. The latter relation will be redescribed as a perceptual simulation of the image subject elicited by the depicting surface. Contrary to ordinary image seeing, aesthetic perception is, according to Husserl, characterized by an accrued “interest” or “delight in the appearance,” i.e., enhanced attention to the depicting surface. In the second part of the chapter, I will then, by means of examples, lay bare some essential properties of the depicting surface, which specifically inform aesthetic perception, and which belong to appearance proper and not to what appears. Finally, I will show the relevance of Husserl’s analysis for more recent discussions of depiction, revolving around Wollheim’s notion of “twofoldness.”.

KW - Aesthetic Perception

KW - Depiction

KW - Husserl

KW - Image Consciousness

KW - Twofoldness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85174107593&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.4324/9781003434801-12

DO - 10.4324/9781003434801-12

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 9781032562810

T3 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy

SP - 170

EP - 191

BT - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy

A2 - Hopkins, Burt C.

A2 - Santis, Daniele De

PB - Routledge

CY - London

ER -