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Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory

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An absorbing game is a two-person zero-sum repeated game. Some of the entries are “absorbing” in the sense that, following the play of an absorbing entry, with positive probability all future payoffs are equal to that entry's payoff. The outcome of the game is the long-run average payoff. We prove that a two-person zero-sum absorbing game, with either finite or compact action sets, has, for each ε>0, ε-optimal strategies with finite memory. In fact, we show that there is an ε-optimal strategy that depends on the clock and three states of memory.

Original languageEnglish
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Pages (from-to)213-230
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021

    Research areas

  • Absorbing games, Compact action sets, Finite memory, Markov strategies, Stochastic games

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