Department of Economics and Business Economics

A simple model of competition between teams

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A simple model of competition between teams. / Eliaz, Kfir; Wu, Qinggong.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 176, 01.07.2018, p. 372-392.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Eliaz, K & Wu, Q 2018, 'A simple model of competition between teams', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 176, pp. 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

APA

Eliaz, K., & Wu, Q. (2018). A simple model of competition between teams. Journal of Economic Theory, 176, 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

CBE

MLA

Eliaz, Kfir and Qinggong Wu. "A simple model of competition between teams". Journal of Economic Theory. 2018, 176. 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

Vancouver

Eliaz K, Wu Q. A simple model of competition between teams. Journal of Economic Theory. 2018 Jul 1;176:372-392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

Author

Eliaz, Kfir ; Wu, Qinggong. / A simple model of competition between teams. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2018 ; Vol. 176. pp. 372-392.

Bibtex

@article{782909dd15d04f1c99eedf1e315860c3,
title = "A simple model of competition between teams",
abstract = "We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their own team. The team with the higher performance wins, and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical to members of the same team but is unknown to those of the other team. We focus on the case in which a team's performance is the sum of its individual members' performances and analyze monotone equilibria in which members of the same team exert the same effort. We find that the bigger team is more likely to win if individual performance is a concave function of effort, less likely if convex, and equally likely if linear. We also provide a complete characterization of the equilibria for the case in which individual performance is a power function of effort and team value is uniformly distributed. For this case we also investigate how probabilities of winning, total team performance and individual payoffs are affected by the size of the team. The results shed light on the “group-size paradox”.",
keywords = "ALL-PAY AUCTIONS, COLLECTIVE CONTESTS, CONFLICT, EQUILIBRIUM, GOODS, Group size paradox, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, PUBLIC-GOOD PRIZES, RENT-SEEKING, Team contests",
author = "Kfir Eliaz and Qinggong Wu",
year = "2018",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006",
language = "English",
volume = "176",
pages = "372--392",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A simple model of competition between teams

AU - Eliaz, Kfir

AU - Wu, Qinggong

PY - 2018/7/1

Y1 - 2018/7/1

N2 - We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their own team. The team with the higher performance wins, and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical to members of the same team but is unknown to those of the other team. We focus on the case in which a team's performance is the sum of its individual members' performances and analyze monotone equilibria in which members of the same team exert the same effort. We find that the bigger team is more likely to win if individual performance is a concave function of effort, less likely if convex, and equally likely if linear. We also provide a complete characterization of the equilibria for the case in which individual performance is a power function of effort and team value is uniformly distributed. For this case we also investigate how probabilities of winning, total team performance and individual payoffs are affected by the size of the team. The results shed light on the “group-size paradox”.

AB - We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their own team. The team with the higher performance wins, and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical to members of the same team but is unknown to those of the other team. We focus on the case in which a team's performance is the sum of its individual members' performances and analyze monotone equilibria in which members of the same team exert the same effort. We find that the bigger team is more likely to win if individual performance is a concave function of effort, less likely if convex, and equally likely if linear. We also provide a complete characterization of the equilibria for the case in which individual performance is a power function of effort and team value is uniformly distributed. For this case we also investigate how probabilities of winning, total team performance and individual payoffs are affected by the size of the team. The results shed light on the “group-size paradox”.

KW - ALL-PAY AUCTIONS

KW - COLLECTIVE CONTESTS

KW - CONFLICT

KW - EQUILIBRIUM

KW - GOODS

KW - Group size paradox

KW - INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

KW - PUBLIC-GOOD PRIZES

KW - RENT-SEEKING

KW - Team contests

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045570618&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85045570618

VL - 176

SP - 372

EP - 392

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -