TY - JOUR

T1 - A Montero Auction Mechanism to Regulate Antimicrobial Consumption in Agriculture

AU - Belay, Dagim G.

AU - Abate, Tenaw G.

AU - Jensen, Jørgen Dejgaard

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Livestock production accounts for the lion's share of antibiotic consumption worldwide, and the sector is a significant contributor to antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Because farmers do not consider the contribution of their individual consumption of antibiotics to AMR, regulations are necessary to ensure optimal use. However, previously suggested regulatory instruments are either inefficient or nearly impossible to implement, mainly because they fail to address the information asymmetry that exists between farmers and regulators. In this article, we customize and suggest an efficient and incentive-compatible regulatory instrument for antibiotic use based on the Montero auction mechanism (2008). We analytically and empirically demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism is welfare improving as compared to current regulations. For the empirical analysis, we calibrate a simulation model for the Danish livestock sector based on farm accounts data for different types of livestock farms and combine it with calibrated demand functions for antibiotic allowances and a calibrated damage function. Based on the simulation results and the implementation of systems such as the Danish VETSTAT (a detailed accounting of farmers' antibiotic use), we anticipate that the proposed mechanism can be effectively used in the future.

AB - Livestock production accounts for the lion's share of antibiotic consumption worldwide, and the sector is a significant contributor to antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Because farmers do not consider the contribution of their individual consumption of antibiotics to AMR, regulations are necessary to ensure optimal use. However, previously suggested regulatory instruments are either inefficient or nearly impossible to implement, mainly because they fail to address the information asymmetry that exists between farmers and regulators. In this article, we customize and suggest an efficient and incentive-compatible regulatory instrument for antibiotic use based on the Montero auction mechanism (2008). We analytically and empirically demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism is welfare improving as compared to current regulations. For the empirical analysis, we calibrate a simulation model for the Danish livestock sector based on farm accounts data for different types of livestock farms and combine it with calibrated demand functions for antibiotic allowances and a calibrated damage function. Based on the simulation results and the implementation of systems such as the Danish VETSTAT (a detailed accounting of farmers' antibiotic use), we anticipate that the proposed mechanism can be effectively used in the future.

KW - Antibiotics

KW - antibiotic efficacy

KW - antimicrobial resistance

KW - asymmetric information

KW - auctions

KW - common pool resource

KW - externality

KW - mechanism design

U2 - 10.1002/ajae.12079

DO - 10.1002/ajae.12079

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85079596628

VL - 102

SP - 1448

EP - 1467

JO - American Journal of Agricultural Economics

JF - American Journal of Agricultural Economics

SN - 0002-9092

IS - 5

ER -