A generalization of Paillier's public-key system with applications to electronic voting

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  • Department of Computer Science
We propose a generalization of Paillier's probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier's original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Information Security
Pages (from-to)371-385
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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