A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015)
EditorsQiang Yang, Michael Wooldridge
Number of pages8
PublisherAAAI Press
Publication year2015
Pages481-488
ISBN (print)978-1-57735-738-4
Publication statusPublished - 2015
EventInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Buinos Aires, Argentina
Duration: 25 Jul 201531 Jul 2015
Conference number: 24

Conference

ConferenceInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Nummer24
LandArgentina
ByBuinos Aires
Periode25/07/201531/07/2015

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