Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies. / Bokobza, Laure; Krishnarajan, Suthan; Nyrup, Jacob et al.
In: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 07.2022, p. 1437-1452.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Morning After:
T2 - Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies
AU - Bokobza, Laure
AU - Krishnarajan, Suthan
AU - Nyrup, Jacob
AU - Sakstrup, Casper
AU - Lasse, Aaskoven
PY - 2022/7
Y1 - 2022/7
N2 - All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.
AB - All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.
KW - DEMOCRACY
KW - cabinets
KW - coup attempts
KW - dictator-elite relations
KW - dictatorship
KW - purges
U2 - 10.1086/716952
DO - 10.1086/716952
M3 - Journal article
VL - 84
SP - 1437
EP - 1452
JO - Journal of Politics
JF - Journal of Politics
SN - 0022-3816
IS - 3
ER -