Department of Political Science

Suthan Krishnarajan

The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies. / Bokobza, Laure; Krishnarajan, Suthan; Nyrup, Jacob et al.

In: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 07.2022, p. 1437-1452.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Bokobza, L, Krishnarajan, S, Nyrup, J, Sakstrup, C & Lasse, A 2022, 'The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies', The Journal of Politics, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 1437-1452. https://doi.org/10.1086/716952

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Bokobza L, Krishnarajan S, Nyrup J, Sakstrup C, Lasse A. The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies. The Journal of Politics. 2022 Jul;84(3):1437-1452. doi: 10.1086/716952

Author

Bokobza, Laure ; Krishnarajan, Suthan ; Nyrup, Jacob et al. / The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies. In: The Journal of Politics. 2022 ; Vol. 84, No. 3. pp. 1437-1452.

Bibtex

@article{a5de5714be464602a299794fe4e5d178,
title = "The Morning After:: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies",
abstract = "All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.",
keywords = "DEMOCRACY, cabinets, coup attempts, dictator-elite relations, dictatorship, purges",
author = "Laure Bokobza and Suthan Krishnarajan and Jacob Nyrup and Casper Sakstrup and Aaskoven Lasse",
year = "2022",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1086/716952",
language = "English",
volume = "84",
pages = "1437--1452",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
issn = "0022-3816",
publisher = "The University of Chicago Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Morning After:

T2 - Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies

AU - Bokobza, Laure

AU - Krishnarajan, Suthan

AU - Nyrup, Jacob

AU - Sakstrup, Casper

AU - Lasse, Aaskoven

PY - 2022/7

Y1 - 2022/7

N2 - All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.

AB - All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.

KW - DEMOCRACY

KW - cabinets

KW - coup attempts

KW - dictator-elite relations

KW - dictatorship

KW - purges

U2 - 10.1086/716952

DO - 10.1086/716952

M3 - Journal article

VL - 84

SP - 1437

EP - 1452

JO - Journal of Politics

JF - Journal of Politics

SN - 0022-3816

IS - 3

ER -