TY - JOUR

T1 - The Democratic Paradox:

T2 - Are National Elections Always Good for Satisfaction with Democracy in Europe?

AU - Krishnarajan, Suthan

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people's satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the following electoral term-regardless of election results and economic growth after the election. When held during economic downturns, elections reduce democratic satisfaction until the next election-again, regardless of such post-election developments. An analysis of 29 European democracies in the period 1973-2019 supports these propositions and suggests that the disparate effects of national elections endure during most of the electoral term. These findings are robust to an array of model specifications, including when accounting for several pre-election and post-election developments.

AB - This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people's satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the following electoral term-regardless of election results and economic growth after the election. When held during economic downturns, elections reduce democratic satisfaction until the next election-again, regardless of such post-election developments. An analysis of 29 European democracies in the period 1973-2019 supports these propositions and suggests that the disparate effects of national elections endure during most of the electoral term. These findings are robust to an array of model specifications, including when accounting for several pre-election and post-election developments.

KW - ATTITUDES

KW - DYNAMICS

KW - ECONOMIC-CRISIS

KW - INSTITUTIONS

KW - MECHANISM

KW - PARTICIPATION

KW - POLICY PREFERENCES

KW - POLITICAL EFFICACY

KW - VOTERS

KW - WINNERS

KW - election economy

KW - elections

KW - satisfaction with democracy

U2 - 10.1093/ser/mwac029

DO - 10.1093/ser/mwac029

M3 - Journal article

JO - Socio-Economic Review

JF - Socio-Economic Review

SN - 1475-1461

ER -