Vice-Dean for Research and Talent, Aarhus BSS, Professor, PhD
 
PhD, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1991; MA, Warwick, 1986
Professor, 2003-; Associate Professor, 1993-2003; Assistant Professor, 1990-1993
Administrative Assistant: Margrethe Vejs-Petersen (+45 93508926, margrethe@au.dk)

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Per Baltzer Overgaard is Professor and Vice-Dean for Research and Talent Development at Aarhus  University, Business and Social Sciences, and he was previously Head of the School of Economics and Management (2006 - 2011). He received his PhD from CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, 1991, and holds an MA (Econ) from Warwick University, UK, 1986. He has studied at University of Aarhus (1981 – 85), Warwick University (1985 – 86), CORE (1987 – 89), and UCLA (1989 – 90). His primary research and teaching interests are in Economics of Information, Contract Theory, Auction Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Business Strategy, Antitrust and Business Regulation. Recent work includes analyses of pre-auction offers and buy-out offers in auctions, equilibria in multi-sender signaling games and the role of market transparency in repeated oligopoly. He has been a member of the Danish Social Science Research Council (2006 - 2010) and is presently a member of the Danish Rail Regulatory Authority (since 2010).

Teaching Interests

• Economics of Information and Contracting
• Auctions and Mechanisms
• Game Theory
• Business Strategy
• Industrial Organization

Research Interests

• Industrial Organization
• The Economics of Information and Contracting
• Auctions and Mechanisms
• Game Theory
• Antitrust and Regulation

Selected Publications

• P.B. Overgaard, 1994, The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources, Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, 452-478.
• S. Albæk, H.P. Møllgaard and P.B. Overgaard, 1997, Government Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case, Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 429-443.
• M.N. Hertzendorf and P.B. Overgaard, 2001, Price Competition and Advertising Signals - Signaling by Competing Senders, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10: 621-662.
• R. Orzach, P.B. Overgaard and Y. Tauman, 2002, Modest Advertising Signals Strength, RAND Journal of Economics 33: 340-358.
• R. Kirkegaard and P.B. Overgaard, 2008, Pre-Auction offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 63: 145-165.
• R. Kirkegaard and P.B. Overgaard, 2008, Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand, RAND Journal of Economics 39: 770-789.