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Luke Nicholas Taylor

Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches

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Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches. / Cartledge, Marcella; Taylor, Luke Nicholas.

In: Applied Economics, Vol. 54, No. 30, 2022, p. 3505-3520.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Cartledge, M & Taylor, LN 2022, 'Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches', Applied Economics, vol. 54, no. 30, pp. 3505-3520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

APA

Cartledge, M., & Taylor, L. N. (2022). Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches. Applied Economics, 54(30), 3505-3520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

CBE

Cartledge M, Taylor LN. 2022. Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches. Applied Economics. 54(30):3505-3520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

MLA

Cartledge, Marcella and Luke Nicholas Taylor. "Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches". Applied Economics. 2022, 54(30). 3505-3520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

Vancouver

Cartledge M, Taylor LN. Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches. Applied Economics. 2022;54(30):3505-3520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

Author

Cartledge, Marcella ; Taylor, Luke Nicholas. / Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches. In: Applied Economics. 2022 ; Vol. 54, No. 30. pp. 3505-3520.

Bibtex

@article{af3457079206422a8e5d6ad650082e47,
title = "Incentive Pay and Decision Quality:: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches",
abstract = "Using play-by-play American football data and panel data on head coach remuneration, we test whether a head coach{\textquoteright}s incentive pay affects the quality of their decisions. We proceed by first estimating an {\textquoteleft}optimal strategy{\textquoteright} for first-down offensive plays, then investigate whether the gap between actual and optimal choices is affected by incentive pay. In contrast to merely looking at the outcome of an agent{\textquoteright}s choice, our approach considers the decision environment and the resources available. We find a small, but significant, negative effect of incentive pay on decision quality. Critically, this effect is not found when looking at raw outcome measures.",
keywords = "Incentive pay, decision quality, panel data, semiparametric estimation, sports",
author = "Marcella Cartledge and Taylor, {Luke Nicholas}",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643",
language = "English",
volume = "54",
pages = "3505--3520",
journal = "Applied Economics",
issn = "0003-6846",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "30",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentive Pay and Decision Quality:

T2 - Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches

AU - Cartledge, Marcella

AU - Taylor, Luke Nicholas

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Using play-by-play American football data and panel data on head coach remuneration, we test whether a head coach’s incentive pay affects the quality of their decisions. We proceed by first estimating an ‘optimal strategy’ for first-down offensive plays, then investigate whether the gap between actual and optimal choices is affected by incentive pay. In contrast to merely looking at the outcome of an agent’s choice, our approach considers the decision environment and the resources available. We find a small, but significant, negative effect of incentive pay on decision quality. Critically, this effect is not found when looking at raw outcome measures.

AB - Using play-by-play American football data and panel data on head coach remuneration, we test whether a head coach’s incentive pay affects the quality of their decisions. We proceed by first estimating an ‘optimal strategy’ for first-down offensive plays, then investigate whether the gap between actual and optimal choices is affected by incentive pay. In contrast to merely looking at the outcome of an agent’s choice, our approach considers the decision environment and the resources available. We find a small, but significant, negative effect of incentive pay on decision quality. Critically, this effect is not found when looking at raw outcome measures.

KW - Incentive pay

KW - decision quality

KW - panel data

KW - semiparametric estimation

KW - sports

U2 - 10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

DO - 10.1080/00036846.2021.2010643

M3 - Journal article

VL - 54

SP - 3505

EP - 3520

JO - Applied Economics

JF - Applied Economics

SN - 0003-6846

IS - 30

ER -