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Daniel Finke

Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism

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Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. / Koenig, Thomas; Finke, Daniel.

In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, No. 2, 03.2015, p. 262-282.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Koenig, T & Finke, D 2015, 'Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 262-282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713503298

APA

Koenig, T., & Finke, D. (2015). Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(2), 262-282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713503298

CBE

Koenig T, Finke D. 2015. Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 59(2):262-282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713503298

MLA

Koenig, Thomas and Daniel Finke. "Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2015, 59(2). 262-282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713503298

Vancouver

Koenig T, Finke D. Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2015 Mar;59(2):262-282. doi: 10.1177/0022002713503298

Author

Koenig, Thomas ; Finke, Daniel. / Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2015 ; Vol. 59, No. 2. pp. 262-282.

Bibtex

@article{9e83090461c84270b9b276656d1c9161,
title = "Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism",
abstract = "How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.",
keywords = "terrorism, legislative governance, coalition politics, bicameralism, HUMAN-RIGHTS, COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, DECISION-MAKING, FOREIGN-AID, CONSEQUENCES, ELECTIONS, US",
author = "Thomas Koenig and Daniel Finke",
year = "2015",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1177/0022002713503298",
language = "English",
volume = "59",
pages = "262--282",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
issn = "0022-0027",
publisher = ": SAGE Publications ",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism

AU - Koenig, Thomas

AU - Finke, Daniel

PY - 2015/3

Y1 - 2015/3

N2 - How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.

AB - How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.

KW - terrorism

KW - legislative governance

KW - coalition politics

KW - bicameralism

KW - HUMAN-RIGHTS

KW - COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

KW - DECISION-MAKING

KW - FOREIGN-AID

KW - CONSEQUENCES

KW - ELECTIONS

KW - US

U2 - 10.1177/0022002713503298

DO - 10.1177/0022002713503298

M3 - Journal article

VL - 59

SP - 262

EP - 282

JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution

JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution

SN - 0022-0027

IS - 2

ER -