Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism. / Koenig, Thomas; Finke, Daniel.
In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, No. 2, 03.2015, p. 262-282.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism
AU - Koenig, Thomas
AU - Finke, Daniel
PY - 2015/3
Y1 - 2015/3
N2 - How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.
AB - How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.
KW - terrorism
KW - legislative governance
KW - coalition politics
KW - bicameralism
KW - HUMAN-RIGHTS
KW - COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY
KW - DECISION-MAKING
KW - FOREIGN-AID
KW - CONSEQUENCES
KW - ELECTIONS
KW - US
U2 - 10.1177/0022002713503298
DO - 10.1177/0022002713503298
M3 - Journal article
VL - 59
SP - 262
EP - 282
JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
SN - 0022-0027
IS - 2
ER -