Department of Political Science

Daniel Finke

Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  • Thomas Koenig, Univ Mannheim, University of Mannheim, Denmark
  • Daniel Finke

How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Volume59
Issue2
Pages (from-to)262-282
Number of pages21
ISSN0022-0027
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2015
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • terrorism, legislative governance, coalition politics, bicameralism, HUMAN-RIGHTS, COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, DECISION-MAKING, FOREIGN-AID, CONSEQUENCES, ELECTIONS, US

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ID: 90662800