Department of Political Science

Daniel Finke

Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations

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Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations. / Finke, Daniel.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 10.2009, p. 543-569.

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Finke, Daniel. / Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2009 ; Vol. 21, No. 4. pp. 543-569.

Bibtex

@article{738eed9e69b44171be3f158f04da3671,
title = "Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations",
abstract = "This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states' positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states' positions at the IGC 2003-4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.",
keywords = "constitutional theory, European integration, nonseparability, ANALYZING ROLL CALLS, EUROPEAN-UNION, DECISION-MAKING, ALIGNMENTS, POLITICS",
author = "Daniel Finke",
year = "2009",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1177/0951629809339803",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "543--569",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical Politics",
issn = "0951-6298",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations

AU - Finke, Daniel

PY - 2009/10

Y1 - 2009/10

N2 - This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states' positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states' positions at the IGC 2003-4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.

AB - This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states' positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states' positions at the IGC 2003-4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.

KW - constitutional theory

KW - European integration

KW - nonseparability

KW - ANALYZING ROLL CALLS

KW - EUROPEAN-UNION

KW - DECISION-MAKING

KW - ALIGNMENTS

KW - POLITICS

U2 - 10.1177/0951629809339803

DO - 10.1177/0951629809339803

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 543

EP - 569

JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics

JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics

SN - 0951-6298

IS - 4

ER -