Department of Political Science

Daniel Finke

Domestic-level Parliamentary Scrutiny and Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Inside the European Parliament political groups reveal levels of voting cohesion similar to that we observe in national parliaments. Faced with a conflict of interests between their national party and their European group, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) surprisingly often prioritize the latter principal over the former. In this article, I argue that domestic-level parliamentary scrutiny can have a tremendous impact on MEPs' loyalties. Using data on the voting behaviour of German and Czech MEPs, I find that, under scrutiny, MEPs from governing parties are significantly more likely to vote against the instructions of their group leadership. The effect of domestic-level scrutiny on MEPs from opposition parties is weaker and depends on the dossier's political salience. These results provide further support for the strategic use of parliamentary scrutiny in European Union politics.

Original languageEnglish
JournalGovernment and Opposition
Volume49
Issue2
Pages (from-to)207-231
Number of pages25
ISSN0017-257X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR, COMPETING DEMANDS, PREFERENCES, EU

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