Department of Political Science

Daniel Finke

Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control

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Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics : Between whistle blowing and opposition control. / Finke, Daniel; Dannwolf, Tanja.

In: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 52, No. 6, 10.2013, p. 715-746.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Finke, D & Dannwolf, T 2013, 'Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 715-746. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12014

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Author

Finke, Daniel ; Dannwolf, Tanja. / Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics : Between whistle blowing and opposition control. In: European Journal of Political Research. 2013 ; Vol. 52, No. 6. pp. 715-746.

Bibtex

@article{fe97f380c08e4437af996dd053cbf567,
title = "Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control",
abstract = "Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.",
keywords = "European Union, delegation, two-level game, multilevel governance, legislative politics, EU AFFAIRS, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES, NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, OVERSIGHT, ACCOUNTABILITY, CONSTRAINTS, GOVERNMENTS, DELEGATION",
author = "Daniel Finke and Tanja Dannwolf",
year = "2013",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1111/1475-6765.12014",
language = "English",
volume = "52",
pages = "715--746",
journal = "European Journal of Political Research",
issn = "0304-4130",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics

T2 - Between whistle blowing and opposition control

AU - Finke, Daniel

AU - Dannwolf, Tanja

PY - 2013/10

Y1 - 2013/10

N2 - Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

AB - Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

KW - European Union

KW - delegation

KW - two-level game

KW - multilevel governance

KW - legislative politics

KW - EU AFFAIRS

KW - PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

KW - NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

KW - OVERSIGHT

KW - ACCOUNTABILITY

KW - CONSTRAINTS

KW - GOVERNMENTS

KW - DELEGATION

U2 - 10.1111/1475-6765.12014

DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12014

M3 - Journal article

VL - 52

SP - 715

EP - 746

JO - European Journal of Political Research

JF - European Journal of Political Research

SN - 0304-4130

IS - 6

ER -