Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics : Between whistle blowing and opposition control. / Finke, Daniel; Dannwolf, Tanja.
In: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 52, No. 6, 10.2013, p. 715-746.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics
T2 - Between whistle blowing and opposition control
AU - Finke, Daniel
AU - Dannwolf, Tanja
PY - 2013/10
Y1 - 2013/10
N2 - Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.
AB - Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.
KW - European Union
KW - delegation
KW - two-level game
KW - multilevel governance
KW - legislative politics
KW - EU AFFAIRS
KW - PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES
KW - NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS
KW - OVERSIGHT
KW - ACCOUNTABILITY
KW - CONSTRAINTS
KW - GOVERNMENTS
KW - DELEGATION
U2 - 10.1111/1475-6765.12014
DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12014
M3 - Journal article
VL - 52
SP - 715
EP - 746
JO - European Journal of Political Research
JF - European Journal of Political Research
SN - 0304-4130
IS - 6
ER -