Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Challenges to Intergovernmentalism : An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht. / Finke, Daniel.
In: West European Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 910760345, 2009, p. 466-495.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Challenges to Intergovernmentalism
T2 - 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest-Political-Science-Association
AU - Finke, Daniel
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.
AB - During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.
KW - EUROPEAN-UNION
KW - 2-LEVEL GAMES
KW - DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS
KW - INSTITUTIONS
KW - RATIFICATION
KW - PREFERENCES
KW - INFORMATION
KW - CONVENTION
KW - AMSTERDAM
KW - MODELS
U2 - 10.1080/01402380902779055
DO - 10.1080/01402380902779055
M3 - Journal article
VL - 32
SP - 466
EP - 495
JO - West European Politics
JF - West European Politics
SN - 0140-2382
IS - 3
M1 - 910760345
Y2 - 12 April 2007 through 15 April 2007
ER -