Department of Political Science

Daniel Finke

Challenges to Intergovernmentalism: An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Challenges to Intergovernmentalism : An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht. / Finke, Daniel.

In: West European Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 910760345, 2009, p. 466-495.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{3fdfb69ff8654b0d894371ad32b02455,
title = "Challenges to Intergovernmentalism: An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht",
abstract = "During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.",
keywords = "EUROPEAN-UNION, 2-LEVEL GAMES, DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS, INSTITUTIONS, RATIFICATION, PREFERENCES, INFORMATION, CONVENTION, AMSTERDAM, MODELS",
author = "Daniel Finke",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1080/01402380902779055",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "466--495",
journal = "West European Politics",
issn = "0140-2382",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Challenges to Intergovernmentalism

T2 - An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht

AU - Finke, Daniel

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.

AB - During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.

KW - EUROPEAN-UNION

KW - 2-LEVEL GAMES

KW - DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

KW - INSTITUTIONS

KW - RATIFICATION

KW - PREFERENCES

KW - INFORMATION

KW - CONVENTION

KW - AMSTERDAM

KW - MODELS

U2 - 10.1080/01402380902779055

DO - 10.1080/01402380902779055

M3 - Journal article

VL - 32

SP - 466

EP - 495

JO - West European Politics

JF - West European Politics

SN - 0140-2382

IS - 3

M1 - 910760345

ER -