Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. / Schneider, Gerald; Finke, Daniel; Bailer, Stefanie.
In: Political Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1, 02.2010, p. 85-103.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining Power in the European Union
T2 - An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models
AU - Schneider, Gerald
AU - Finke, Daniel
AU - Bailer, Stefanie
PY - 2010/2
Y1 - 2010/2
N2 - This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.
AB - This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.
KW - DECISION-MAKING MODELS
KW - VOTING POWER
KW - 2-LEVEL GAMES
KW - DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS
KW - EU
KW - COUNCIL
KW - NEGOTIATIONS
KW - INSTITUTIONS
KW - PREFERENCES
KW - COMPROMISE
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 58
SP - 85
EP - 103
JO - Political Studies
JF - Political Studies
SN - 0032-3217
IS - 1
ER -