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Daniel Finke

Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

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Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. / Schneider, Gerald; Finke, Daniel; Bailer, Stefanie.

In: Political Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1, 02.2010, p. 85-103.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Schneider, G, Finke, D & Bailer, S 2010, 'Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models', Political Studies, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 85-103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

APA

Schneider, G., Finke, D., & Bailer, S. (2010). Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. Political Studies, 58(1), 85-103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

CBE

Schneider G, Finke D, Bailer S. 2010. Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. Political Studies. 58(1):85-103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

MLA

Schneider, Gerald, Daniel Finke and Stefanie Bailer. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models". Political Studies. 2010, 58(1). 85-103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

Vancouver

Schneider G, Finke D, Bailer S. Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. Political Studies. 2010 Feb;58(1):85-103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

Author

Schneider, Gerald ; Finke, Daniel ; Bailer, Stefanie. / Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. In: Political Studies. 2010 ; Vol. 58, No. 1. pp. 85-103.

Bibtex

@article{15334d4a8cdf4d7da91a1acee85072ca,
title = "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models",
abstract = "This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.",
keywords = "DECISION-MAKING MODELS, VOTING POWER, 2-LEVEL GAMES, DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS, EU, COUNCIL, NEGOTIATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, PREFERENCES, COMPROMISE",
author = "Gerald Schneider and Daniel Finke and Stefanie Bailer",
year = "2010",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "85--103",
journal = "Political Studies",
issn = "0032-3217",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bargaining Power in the European Union

T2 - An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

AU - Schneider, Gerald

AU - Finke, Daniel

AU - Bailer, Stefanie

PY - 2010/2

Y1 - 2010/2

N2 - This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.

AB - This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.

KW - DECISION-MAKING MODELS

KW - VOTING POWER

KW - 2-LEVEL GAMES

KW - DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

KW - EU

KW - COUNCIL

KW - NEGOTIATIONS

KW - INSTITUTIONS

KW - PREFERENCES

KW - COMPROMISE

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 58

SP - 85

EP - 103

JO - Political Studies

JF - Political Studies

SN - 0032-3217

IS - 1

ER -