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Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation. / Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn.

In: SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, 2005, p. 15-28.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Steglich-Petersen, A 2005, 'Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation', SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 6, pp. 15-28.

APA

Steglich-Petersen, A. (2005). Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation. SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 6, 15-28.

CBE

Steglich-Petersen A. 2005. Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation. SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy. 6:15-28.

MLA

Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. "Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation". SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy. 2005, 6. 15-28.

Vancouver

Steglich-Petersen A. Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation. SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy. 2005;6:15-28.

Author

Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. / Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation. In: SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy. 2005 ; Vol. 6. pp. 15-28.

Bibtex

@article{842b435083fb11dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation",
abstract = "In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a way that establishes knowledge itself as a causal factor. The argument thus fails to support his overall claim that knowledge should be conceived as a state of mind.",
author = "Asbj{\o}rn Steglich-Petersen",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "15--28",
journal = "SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "1600-1974",
publisher = "De Gruyter GmbH",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Williamson on knowledge, action, and causation

AU - Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a way that establishes knowledge itself as a causal factor. The argument thus fails to support his overall claim that knowledge should be conceived as a state of mind.

AB - In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a way that establishes knowledge itself as a causal factor. The argument thus fails to support his overall claim that knowledge should be conceived as a state of mind.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 15

EP - 28

JO - SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy

JF - SATS - Northern European Journal of Philosophy

SN - 1600-1974

ER -