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Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

No norm needed: on the aim of belief

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

No norm needed: on the aim of belief. / Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn.

In: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 56, 2006, p. 499-516.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Steglich-Petersen, A 2006, 'No norm needed: on the aim of belief', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 56, pp. 499-516.

APA

Steglich-Petersen, A. (2006). No norm needed: on the aim of belief. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 499-516.

CBE

Steglich-Petersen A. 2006. No norm needed: on the aim of belief. The Philosophical Quarterly. 56:499-516.

MLA

Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. "No norm needed: on the aim of belief". The Philosophical Quarterly. 2006, 56. 499-516.

Vancouver

Steglich-Petersen A. No norm needed: on the aim of belief. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2006;56:499-516.

Author

Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. / No norm needed: on the aim of belief. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. 2006 ; Vol. 56. pp. 499-516.

Bibtex

@article{1331b35083f611dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "No norm needed: on the aim of belief",
abstract = "Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.",
author = "Asbj{\o}rn Steglich-Petersen",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "499--516",
journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - No norm needed: on the aim of belief

AU - Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.

AB - Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 56

SP - 499

EP - 516

JO - The Philosophical Quarterly

JF - The Philosophical Quarterly

ER -