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Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective

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Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective. / Nielsen, Lasse.

I: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Bind 18, Nr. 2, 2015, s. 403-415.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Harvard

Nielsen, L 2015, 'Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, bind 18, nr. 2, s. 403-415. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

APA

Nielsen, L. (2015). Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(2), 403-415. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

CBE

Nielsen L. 2015. Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 18(2):403-415. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

MLA

Nielsen, Lasse. "Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2015, 18(2). 403-415. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

Vancouver

Author

Nielsen, Lasse. / Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective. I: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2015 ; Bind 18, Nr. 2. s. 403-415.

Bibtex

@article{e5fd877020f34858af38aa399cd834f3,
title = "Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective",
abstract = "The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen{\textquoteright}s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to justify why health is distinctively valuable from within a capability framework – these are Sridhar Venkatapuram{\textquoteright}s conception of health as the central human meta-capability and, respectively, Norman Daniels{\textquoteright} embrace of the capability metric in his use of Rawls{\textquoteright} principle of fair equality of opportunity. The paper argues that none of these accounts succeed in providing a plausible justification of the value of health. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative more complex justification, closely tied to different but central element of the capability view, that captures the core intuitions of both Venkatapuram and Daniels{\textquoteright} accounts but without being vulnerable to the objections raised against each of them. This, the paper ",
author = "Lasse Nielsen",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "403--415",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective

AU - Nielsen, Lasse

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen’s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to justify why health is distinctively valuable from within a capability framework – these are Sridhar Venkatapuram’s conception of health as the central human meta-capability and, respectively, Norman Daniels’ embrace of the capability metric in his use of Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. The paper argues that none of these accounts succeed in providing a plausible justification of the value of health. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative more complex justification, closely tied to different but central element of the capability view, that captures the core intuitions of both Venkatapuram and Daniels’ accounts but without being vulnerable to the objections raised against each of them. This, the paper

AB - The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen’s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to justify why health is distinctively valuable from within a capability framework – these are Sridhar Venkatapuram’s conception of health as the central human meta-capability and, respectively, Norman Daniels’ embrace of the capability metric in his use of Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. The paper argues that none of these accounts succeed in providing a plausible justification of the value of health. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative more complex justification, closely tied to different but central element of the capability view, that captures the core intuitions of both Venkatapuram and Daniels’ accounts but without being vulnerable to the objections raised against each of them. This, the paper

UR - http://rdcu.be/mRaB

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

DO - 10.1007/s10677-014-9526-8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 403

EP - 415

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 2

ER -