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Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingBidrag til bog/antologiForskningpeer review

Standard

Who's afraid of nudging by social robots? / Rodogno, Raffaele.
Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. red. / Johanna Seibt; Raul Hakli; Marco Nørskov. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingBidrag til bog/antologiForskningpeer review

Harvard

Rodogno, R 2020, Who's afraid of nudging by social robots? i J Seibt, R Hakli & M Nørskov (red), Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

APA

Rodogno, R. (Accepteret/In press). Who's afraid of nudging by social robots? I J. Seibt, R. Hakli, & M. Nørskov (red.), Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics MIT Press.

CBE

Rodogno R. 2020. Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?. Seibt J, Hakli R, Nørskov M, red. I Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MLA

Rodogno, Raffaele "Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?"., Seibt, Johanna Hakli, Raul Nørskov, Marco (red.). Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2020.

Vancouver

Rodogno R. Who's afraid of nudging by social robots? I Seibt J, Hakli R, Nørskov M, red., Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2020

Author

Rodogno, Raffaele. / Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?. Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics. red. / Johanna Seibt ; Raul Hakli ; Marco Nørskov. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2020.

Bibtex

@inbook{7bfee68f32b048eaa39a5ac3b2e765b5,
title = "Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?",
abstract = "In this paper I explore the ethics of nudging performed by social robots and ask whether it involves novel challenges. Having defined nudging (§2), I will argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with nudging but that its permissibility depends on the combination of a number of features (§3). I will then discuss the case of nudging by social robots (§4). The point here is to inspect whether the technological features peculiar to social robots, and in particular the fact that they incite users to relate affectively and grow attached to the robot, add something new to the ethics of nudging. I argue that they don{\textquoteright}t but that, nonetheless, there is good reason to be wary of nudging by robots as their special features might make them particularly efficient at nudging. Finally (§5), I discuss the sense in which social robots are by their very nature inescapably nudging technologies and consider one last time whether this might raise ethical problems that nudging more in general does not pose. ",
author = "Raffaele Rodogno",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
editor = "Johanna Seibt and Hakli, {Raul } and Marco N{\o}rskov",
booktitle = "Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics",
publisher = "MIT Press",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Who's afraid of nudging by social robots?

AU - Rodogno, Raffaele

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - In this paper I explore the ethics of nudging performed by social robots and ask whether it involves novel challenges. Having defined nudging (§2), I will argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with nudging but that its permissibility depends on the combination of a number of features (§3). I will then discuss the case of nudging by social robots (§4). The point here is to inspect whether the technological features peculiar to social robots, and in particular the fact that they incite users to relate affectively and grow attached to the robot, add something new to the ethics of nudging. I argue that they don’t but that, nonetheless, there is good reason to be wary of nudging by robots as their special features might make them particularly efficient at nudging. Finally (§5), I discuss the sense in which social robots are by their very nature inescapably nudging technologies and consider one last time whether this might raise ethical problems that nudging more in general does not pose.

AB - In this paper I explore the ethics of nudging performed by social robots and ask whether it involves novel challenges. Having defined nudging (§2), I will argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with nudging but that its permissibility depends on the combination of a number of features (§3). I will then discuss the case of nudging by social robots (§4). The point here is to inspect whether the technological features peculiar to social robots, and in particular the fact that they incite users to relate affectively and grow attached to the robot, add something new to the ethics of nudging. I argue that they don’t but that, nonetheless, there is good reason to be wary of nudging by robots as their special features might make them particularly efficient at nudging. Finally (§5), I discuss the sense in which social robots are by their very nature inescapably nudging technologies and consider one last time whether this might raise ethical problems that nudging more in general does not pose.

M3 - Book chapter

BT - Robophilosophy: Philosophy of, for, and by social robotics

A2 - Seibt, Johanna

A2 - Hakli, Raul

A2 - Nørskov, Marco

PB - MIT Press

CY - Cambridge, MA

ER -