Towards long-term economic welfare in deregulated electricity markets: Testing capacity mechanisms in an experimental setting

David Lara-Arango*, Santiago Arango-Aramburo, Erik R. Larsen

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

7 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

A number of mechanisms have been suggested for capacity adequacy. A study using laboratory experiments both of procurement of long-term strategic reserve contracting and of centralized auctioning for capacity contracts suggests that the centralized auctioning process stabilizes laboratory markets and provides economic welfare comparable to a free market. The strategic reserve contracting process does not seem to improve either of the two aspects compared to a non-regulated market.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftElectricity Journal
Vol/bind30
Nummer6
Sider (fra-til)53-71
Antal sider19
ISSN1040-6190
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017

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