Institut for Statskundskab

The Yes Minister Effect: Delegated leadership and international bureaucrats in international institutional bargaining

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskning

  • Derek Beach
  • Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, Statskundskab KU, Danmark
  • Institut for Statskundskab
Our argument in this paper is that even in what can be termed a ‘least likely’ case of states negotiating between themselves on creating new or reforming existing rules of cooperation for an institution, states are often dependent upon international bureaucrats to help them translate their relatively vague common interests into actual contractual agreements. We develop a theory of delegated leadership that explains why and when we should expect international bureaucrats to matter in institutional bargaining between states, and apply the theory in two case studies: the negotiation of the 1996-97 IGC and the institutional provisions of the Uruguay Round. It is argued that when governments are dependent upon international bureaucrats, this gives the bureaucrats opportunities to skew the final deals closer towards their own pro-integrative and bureaucratic-legalistic preferences.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelInternational Studies Association 2006 Annual Convention
Antal sider40
ForlagDepartment of Political Science, University of Aarhus and University of Copenhagen
Udgivelsesår2006
StatusUdgivet - 2006
Begivenhed47th Annual International Studies Association Convention - San Diego, USA
Varighed: 22 mar. 200625 mar. 2006

Konference

Konference47th Annual International Studies Association Convention
LandUSA
BySan Diego
Periode22/03/200625/03/2006

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