The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies

Lauritz Aastrup Munch; Jakob Thrane Mainz

doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00680-1

The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies

Lauritz Aastrup Munch^*, Jakob Thrane Mainz

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Institut for Kultur og Samfund - Filosofi, fag

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

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Abstract

Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. Others have argued that sharing personal information about yourself that license such inferences can by itself violate the right to privacy. In this paper, we argue that the latter view should be rejected.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Artikelnummer	83
Tidsskrift	Philosophy and Technology
Vol/bind	36
Nummer	4
ISSN	2210-5433
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00680-1
Status	Udgivet - dec. 2023

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10.1007/s13347-023-00680-1Licens: CC BY

The Moral Significance of Privacy DependenciesForlagets udgivne version, 819 KBLicens: CC BY

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AB - Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. Others have argued that sharing personal information about yourself that license such inferences can by itself violate the right to privacy. In this paper, we argue that the latter view should be rejected.

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The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies

Abstract

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