Abstract
The current ideal of value-freedom holds non-cognitive values to be illegitimate in theory appraisal but legitimate in earlier stages of the research process, for example, when affecting the selection of topics or the generation of hypotheses. Respective decisions are often considered as part of a context of discovery and as irrelevant for the justification and assessment of theories. I will argue that this premise of an epistemic independence of theory appraisal, though often taken for granted, is false. Due to the possibility of value-laden blind spots, decisions in discovery can have an indirect impact on theory assessment that the value-free ideal cannot deal with. This argument is illustrated by a case study from women's health research, namely the assessment of hormone replacement therapy as a prevention of coronary heart diseases. In consequence, the epistemic trustworthiness of science is promoted more by a pluralism of non-cognitive values than by their exclusion; and a normative philosophy of science needs to enlarge its focus to include the context of discovery as well as the social conditions of science. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
| Vol/bind | 49 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 18-26 |
| Antal sider | 9 |
| ISSN | 0039-3681 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - feb. 2015 |