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The Burden of Authorship: How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour

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The Burden of Authorship: How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour. / Finke, Daniel.

I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 23, Nr. 4, 2016, s. 604-623.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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Finke, Daniel. / The Burden of Authorship: How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour. I: Journal of European Public Policy. 2016 ; Bind 23, Nr. 4. s. 604-623.

Bibtex

@article{802ef21cdfc34279ab0a4dba0fce3245,
title = "The Burden of Authorship: How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour",
abstract = "I study the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour in theEuropean Parliament. The straightforward expectation would be that members ofparliament are more likely to support their own group{\textquoteright}s amendments. But what if national party leaders reject their group{\textquoteright}s proposal. In this situation party leaders have strong incentives to reinforce party discipline because otherwise they stand to lose credibility in future negotiations. Hence, authorship ties voting behaviour to the bargaining stage by means of credible commitment. Yet, the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour is moderated by electoral rules. I argue that this interaction between agenda rules and electoral rules has significant implicationsfor the political representation in the European Parliament.Analysing voting data from the Sixth European Parliament, I find that the effect of authorship depends on the electoral rules. Members from open list systems avoid conflict with their party leaders by defecting on other groups{\textquoteright} proposals. Members from closed list systems are more likely to defect on their own group{\textquoteright}s proposals, thereby confronting the party leadership. My results have important implications for the discussion on the democratic nature of the European Parliament.",
author = "Daniel Finke",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2015.1059468",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "604--623",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Burden of Authorship: How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour

AU - Finke, Daniel

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - I study the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour in theEuropean Parliament. The straightforward expectation would be that members ofparliament are more likely to support their own group’s amendments. But what if national party leaders reject their group’s proposal. In this situation party leaders have strong incentives to reinforce party discipline because otherwise they stand to lose credibility in future negotiations. Hence, authorship ties voting behaviour to the bargaining stage by means of credible commitment. Yet, the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour is moderated by electoral rules. I argue that this interaction between agenda rules and electoral rules has significant implicationsfor the political representation in the European Parliament.Analysing voting data from the Sixth European Parliament, I find that the effect of authorship depends on the electoral rules. Members from open list systems avoid conflict with their party leaders by defecting on other groups’ proposals. Members from closed list systems are more likely to defect on their own group’s proposals, thereby confronting the party leadership. My results have important implications for the discussion on the democratic nature of the European Parliament.

AB - I study the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour in theEuropean Parliament. The straightforward expectation would be that members ofparliament are more likely to support their own group’s amendments. But what if national party leaders reject their group’s proposal. In this situation party leaders have strong incentives to reinforce party discipline because otherwise they stand to lose credibility in future negotiations. Hence, authorship ties voting behaviour to the bargaining stage by means of credible commitment. Yet, the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour is moderated by electoral rules. I argue that this interaction between agenda rules and electoral rules has significant implicationsfor the political representation in the European Parliament.Analysing voting data from the Sixth European Parliament, I find that the effect of authorship depends on the electoral rules. Members from open list systems avoid conflict with their party leaders by defecting on other groups’ proposals. Members from closed list systems are more likely to defect on their own group’s proposals, thereby confronting the party leadership. My results have important implications for the discussion on the democratic nature of the European Parliament.

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1059468

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1059468

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 604

EP - 623

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 4

ER -