Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems

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Standard

Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. / Pedersen, Mathias; Askarov, Aslan.

Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019. IEEE, 2019. s. 335-350 8823712.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/proceedingKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

Harvard

Pedersen, M & Askarov, A 2019, Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. i Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019., 8823712, IEEE, s. 335-350, 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), Hoboken, USA, 25/06/2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

APA

Pedersen, M., & Askarov, A. (2019). Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. I Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019 (s. 335-350). [8823712] IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

CBE

Pedersen M, Askarov A. 2019. Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. I Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019. IEEE. s. 335-350. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

MLA

Pedersen, Mathias og Aslan Askarov "Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems". Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019. IEEE. 2019, 335-350. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

Vancouver

Pedersen M, Askarov A. Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. I Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019. IEEE. 2019. s. 335-350. 8823712 https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

Author

Pedersen, Mathias ; Askarov, Aslan. / Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems. Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019. IEEE, 2019. s. 335-350

Bibtex

@inproceedings{84969cdbf59440bba9a04e621ecde9fc,
title = "Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems",
abstract = "Underneath every modern programming language is a runtime environment (RTE) that handles features such as automatic memory management and thread scheduling. In the information-flow control (IFC) literature, the RTE is often part of the trusted computing base (TCB), and there has been little focus on applying IFC to the implementation of the RTE itself. In this paper we address this problem by designing an IFC language, Zee, for implementing secure RTEs, thereby removing the RTE from the TCB. We implement Zee and design and implement secure versions of garbage collectors and thread schedulers using Zee. We also prove that a faithful calculus of Zee satisfies a strong variant of timing-sensitive noninterference.",
keywords = "Information flow control",
author = "Mathias Pedersen and Aslan Askarov",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1109/CSF.2019.00030",
language = "English",
pages = "335--350",
booktitle = "Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019",
publisher = "IEEE",
note = "2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) ; Conference date: 25-06-2019 Through 28-06-2019",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Static Enforcement of Security in Runtime Systems

AU - Pedersen, Mathias

AU - Askarov, Aslan

N1 - Conference code: 32

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Underneath every modern programming language is a runtime environment (RTE) that handles features such as automatic memory management and thread scheduling. In the information-flow control (IFC) literature, the RTE is often part of the trusted computing base (TCB), and there has been little focus on applying IFC to the implementation of the RTE itself. In this paper we address this problem by designing an IFC language, Zee, for implementing secure RTEs, thereby removing the RTE from the TCB. We implement Zee and design and implement secure versions of garbage collectors and thread schedulers using Zee. We also prove that a faithful calculus of Zee satisfies a strong variant of timing-sensitive noninterference.

AB - Underneath every modern programming language is a runtime environment (RTE) that handles features such as automatic memory management and thread scheduling. In the information-flow control (IFC) literature, the RTE is often part of the trusted computing base (TCB), and there has been little focus on applying IFC to the implementation of the RTE itself. In this paper we address this problem by designing an IFC language, Zee, for implementing secure RTEs, thereby removing the RTE from the TCB. We implement Zee and design and implement secure versions of garbage collectors and thread schedulers using Zee. We also prove that a faithful calculus of Zee satisfies a strong variant of timing-sensitive noninterference.

KW - Information flow control

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072597101&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

DO - 10.1109/CSF.2019.00030

M3 - Article in proceedings

SP - 335

EP - 350

BT - Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019

PB - IEEE

T2 - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

Y2 - 25 June 2019 through 28 June 2019

ER -