According to the Radical Embodied Cognitive Science portrayed by Anthony Chemero, (i) representational and computational views of embodied cognition are mistaken (ii) embodied cognition is to be explained with tools including dynamical systems theory and (iii) which do not posit mental representations. The goal of this paper is to critically examine this proposal. The nuanced proposal of Chemero concerning mental representations is examined. A diagnosis proposed by Reboul, according to which the debate between eliminativist and realists about mental representation in the philosophy of Embodied Cognitive Science threatens to be merely verbal is explored and, to a certain extent, vindicated in the case of Chemero. It is also argued, on the basis of an example drawn from rhythm cognition, that REC has trouble accounting for some dynamical explanations which indispensably involve representations.
Originalsprog
Engelsk
Titel
Language, Evolution and Mind : Essays in Honour of Anne Reboul