Abstract
Emek et al presented a model of probabilistic single-item second price auctions where an auctioneer who is informed about the type of an item for sale, broadcasts a signal about this type to uninformed bidders. They proved that finding the optimal (for the purpose of generating revenue) pure signaling scheme is strongly NP-hard. In contrast, we prove that finding the optimal mixed signaling scheme can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. For the proof, we show that the problem is strongly related to a problem of optimally bundling divisible goods for auctioning. We also prove that a mixed signaling scheme can in some cases generate twice as much revenue as the best pure signaling scheme and we prove a generally applicable lower bound on the revenue generated by the best mixed signaling scheme.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Titel | EC '12 Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
Redaktører | Boi Faltings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis |
Antal sider | 14 |
Forlag | Association for Computing Machinery |
Publikationsdato | 2012 |
Sider | 234-247 |
ISBN (Trykt) | 978-1-4503-1415-2 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2012 |
Begivenhed | ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - Valencia, Spanien Varighed: 4 jun. 2012 → 8 jun. 2012 Konferencens nummer: 13 |
Konference
Konference | ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
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Nummer | 13 |
Land/Område | Spanien |
By | Valencia |
Periode | 04/06/2012 → 08/06/2012 |