Send mixed signals : earn more, work less

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Abstract

Emek et al presented a model of probabilistic single-item second price auctions where an auctioneer who is informed about the type of an item for sale, broadcasts a signal about this type to uninformed bidders. They proved that finding the optimal (for the purpose of generating revenue) pure signaling scheme is strongly NP-hard. In contrast, we prove that finding the optimal mixed signaling scheme can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. For the proof, we show that the problem is strongly related to a problem of optimally bundling divisible goods for auctioning. We also prove that a mixed signaling scheme can in some cases generate twice as much revenue as the best pure signaling scheme and we prove a generally applicable lower bound on the revenue generated by the best mixed signaling scheme.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelEC '12 Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
RedaktørerBoi Faltings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis
Antal sider14
ForlagAssociation for Computing Machinery
Publikationsdato2012
Sider234-247
ISBN (Trykt)978-1-4503-1415-2
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2012
BegivenhedACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - Valencia, Spanien
Varighed: 4 jun. 20128 jun. 2012
Konferencens nummer: 13

Konference

KonferenceACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Nummer13
Land/OmrådeSpanien
ByValencia
Periode04/06/201208/06/2012

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