Evil actions are just as free as good actions. That is one of the main claims in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, in which he formulates a theory of human agency compatible with this claim. The aim of this paper is to account for Schelling’s justification for this thesis and to show 1) how it relies on the metaphysical outlook he calls ‘Ideal-Realismus’, which I reconstruct as a type of non-reductive naturalism about human agency, and 2) in what way his concept of evil, namely the concept of a non-holistic, self-imposed dissonance between what he calls the ‘particular’ and the ‘universal’, relates to the fact that we humans are undeniably reshaping the ‘Earth System’ of interacting physical, chemical and biological cycles in a negative way.
Originalsprog
Engelsk
Tidsskrift
Schelling Studien. Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie