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Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality

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Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality. / Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper.
I: Journal of Ethics, Bind 25, Nr. 1, 03.2021, s. 81-106.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Harvard

Lippert-Rasmussen, K 2021, 'Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality', Journal of Ethics, bind 25, nr. 1, s. 81-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

APA

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2021). Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality. Journal of Ethics, 25(1), 81-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

CBE

Lippert-Rasmussen K. 2021. Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality. Journal of Ethics. 25(1):81-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

MLA

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. "Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality". Journal of Ethics. 2021, 25(1). 81-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

Vancouver

Lippert-Rasmussen K. Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality. Journal of Ethics. 2021 mar.;25(1):81-106. Epub 2020 aug.. doi: 10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

Author

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. / Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality. I: Journal of Ethics. 2021 ; Bind 25, Nr. 1. s. 81-106.

Bibtex

@article{5cf61e97fdee4715ac6246e86d971f1f,
title = "Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s Objections to Equality",
abstract = "This article presents two rejoinders to Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s arguments against egalitarianism. In developing the first, I introduce a novel relational view of justice: relational sufficiency. This is the view that justice requires us to relate to one another as people with sufficient, but not necessarily equal, standing. I argue that if Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s objections to distributive equality are sound, so are analogous objections to relational equality. However, in a range of cases involving comparative justice (punishment, equal pay, and family relations) we should be relational egalitarians, not relational sufficientarians, and that we must therefore reject Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s objections to distributive equality. The second rejoinder takes the form of a demonstration that all of Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s objections to distributive equality (and relational equality) are unsound. In effect, the article rehabilitates the ideal of distributive equality in the face of Frankfurt{\textquoteright}s objections.",
keywords = "Distributive egalitarianism, Distributive justice, Harry Frankfurt, Relational egalitarianism, Relational sufficientarianism, Sufficientarianism",
author = "Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "81--106",
journal = "Journal of Ethics",
issn = "1382-4554",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality

AU - Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper

PY - 2021/3

Y1 - 2021/3

N2 - This article presents two rejoinders to Frankfurt’s arguments against egalitarianism. In developing the first, I introduce a novel relational view of justice: relational sufficiency. This is the view that justice requires us to relate to one another as people with sufficient, but not necessarily equal, standing. I argue that if Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality are sound, so are analogous objections to relational equality. However, in a range of cases involving comparative justice (punishment, equal pay, and family relations) we should be relational egalitarians, not relational sufficientarians, and that we must therefore reject Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality. The second rejoinder takes the form of a demonstration that all of Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality (and relational equality) are unsound. In effect, the article rehabilitates the ideal of distributive equality in the face of Frankfurt’s objections.

AB - This article presents two rejoinders to Frankfurt’s arguments against egalitarianism. In developing the first, I introduce a novel relational view of justice: relational sufficiency. This is the view that justice requires us to relate to one another as people with sufficient, but not necessarily equal, standing. I argue that if Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality are sound, so are analogous objections to relational equality. However, in a range of cases involving comparative justice (punishment, equal pay, and family relations) we should be relational egalitarians, not relational sufficientarians, and that we must therefore reject Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality. The second rejoinder takes the form of a demonstration that all of Frankfurt’s objections to distributive equality (and relational equality) are unsound. In effect, the article rehabilitates the ideal of distributive equality in the face of Frankfurt’s objections.

KW - Distributive egalitarianism

KW - Distributive justice

KW - Harry Frankfurt

KW - Relational egalitarianism

KW - Relational sufficientarianism

KW - Sufficientarianism

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U2 - 10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

DO - 10.1007/s10892-020-09344-0

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85088936430

VL - 25

SP - 81

EP - 106

JO - Journal of Ethics

JF - Journal of Ethics

SN - 1382-4554

IS - 1

ER -