Abstract
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. In this article, we develop relational sufficientarianism – a view of justice according to which people must relate as sufficients. We distinguish between three versions of this ideal, one that is incompatible with relational egalitarianism and two that are not. Building on this, we argue that relational theorists have good reason to support a pluralist view that is both egalitarian and sufficientarian.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
Vol/bind | 40 |
Nummer | 5 |
Sider (fra-til) | 900-918 |
Antal sider | 19 |
ISSN | 0264-3758 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - nov. 2023 |