Aarhus University Seal / Aarhus Universitets segl

Reference-dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay-as-you-go pensions

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

DOI

The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher-return, private, retirement-saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time-inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference-dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non-paternalistic, welfare rationale for return-dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomic Inquiry
Vol/bind59
Nummer3
Sider (fra-til)1008-1030
Antal sider23
ISSN0095-2583
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2021

Se relationer på Aarhus Universitet Citationsformater

ID: 220082661