Abstract
The value-freedom of science has traditionally been regarded as a presumption of scientific rationality. However, in addition to numerous empirical counterexamples of value-laden science, systematic arguments have put the adequacy of value-freedom as an ideal into doubt during the last decades. This chapter presents the most important debates on the value-free ideal, which concern the epistemic impact of values in the discovery and justification of theories, the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, and the argument from inductive risk. Taken together, these arguments call for new normative models of how to deal with values in science which no longer equate value-laden science with bad science or irrationality. Rather, they suggest that scientific rationality is highly complex, since epistemic issues are interwoven with practical, socio-political, institutional, and ethical ones.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Titel | Handbook of Rationality |
| Redaktører | Wolfgang Spohn, Markus Knauff |
| Udgivelsessted | Cambridge |
| Forlag | MIT Press |
| Publikationsdato | 1 dec. 2021 |
| Sider | 757-765 |
| Kapitel | 14.2 |
| ISBN (Trykt) | 9780262045070 |
| Status | Udgivet - 1 dec. 2021 |