Public key cryptography from weaker assumptions

Publikation: Bog/antologi/afhandling/rapportPh.d.-afhandlingForskning

  • Angela Zottarel, Danmark
This dissertation is focused on the construction of public key cryptographic
primitives and on the relative security analysis in a meaningful theoretic
model.
This work takes two orthogonal directions. In the rst part, we study
cryptographic constructions preserving their security properties also in the
case the adversary is granted access to partial information about the secret
state of the primitive. To do so, we work in an extension of the standard
black-box model, a new framework where possible leakage from the secret
state is taken into account. In particular, we give the rst construction of
signature schemes in a very general leakage model known as auxiliary input.
We also study how leakage in
uences the notion of simulation-based security,
comparing leakage tolerance to adaptive security in the UC-framework.
In the second part of this dissertation, we turn our attention to hardness assumptions.
We start from the well known Decisional Die-Hellman problem
and we extend it, obtaining a hierarchy of generically harder problems. We
also show how to instantiate a wide range of already existing constructions
using our new assumption.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
ForlagInstitut for Datalogi, Aarhus Universitet
Antal sider112
StatusUdgivet - 31 okt. 2013

Note vedr. afhandling

Supervisor: Jesper Buus Nielsen
Co-Supervisor: Ivan Damgard

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