Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

Mogens Jin Pedersen; Nathan Favero; Joohyung Park

doi:10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

Mogens Jin Pedersen, Nathan Favero^*, Joohyung Park

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Institut for Statskundskab

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

5 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Public Management Review
Vol/bind	27
Nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	273-296
Antal sider	24
ISSN	1471-9037
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841
Status	Udgivet - 2025

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Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment. / Pedersen, Mogens Jin; Favero, Nathan; Park, Joohyung.
I: Public Management Review , Bind 27, Nr. 1, 2025, s. 273-296.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avis › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

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Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

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