Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Andreas Bengtson*, Søren Flinch Midtgaard

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

2 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Moral Philosophy
ISSN1740-4681
DOI
StatusE-pub / Early view - 2023

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