On the design of citizens' initiatives in a union of states

Nicola Maaser*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift/Konferencebidrag i tidsskrift /Bidrag til avisTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper studies the design of popular initiatives in unions of states. We analyze the effect of state-specific threshold requirements on the incentives of a rational campaign organizer who decides which constituencies to target. If the heterogeneity of preferences in a population increases with its size, degressively proportional thresholds satisfy the normative objective of 'neutrality' between individuals from different states. In contrast, thresholds which are linear in population size are 'neutral' if a priori no differences between states are acknowledged.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics Letters
Vol/bind120
Nummer1
Sider (fra-til)36-39
Antal sider4
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2013

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