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Oblivious TLS via Multi-party Computation

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In this paper, we describe Oblivious TLS: an MPC protocol that we prove UC secure against a majority of actively corrupted parties. The protocol securely implements TLS 1.3. Thus, any party P who runs TLS can communicate securely with a set of servers running Oblivious TLS; P does not need to modify anything, or even be aware that MPC is used. Applications of this include communication between servers who offer MPC services and clients, to allow the clients to easily and securely provide inputs or receive outputs. Also, an organization could use Oblivious TLS to improve in-house security while seamlessly connecting to external parties. Our protocol runs in the preprocessing model, and we did a preliminary non-optimized implementation of the on-line phase. In this version, the hand-shake completes in about 1 s. Based on implementation results from other work, performance of the record protocol using the standard AES-GCM can be expected to achieve an online throughput of about 3 MB/s.

TitelTopics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021
RedaktørerKenneth G. Paterson
Antal sider24
StatusUdgivet - 2021
BegivenhedRSA Conference Cryptographers’ Track, CT-RSA 2021 -
Varighed: 17 maj 202120 maj 2021


KonferenceRSA Conference Cryptographers’ Track, CT-RSA 2021
SerietitelLecture Notes in Computer Science

Bibliografisk note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Douglas Stebila and the anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback which helped to improve the paper, as well as Roberto Zunino for suggestions and comments on Damiano Abram’s master’s thesis. The work of Sven Trieflinger and Damiano Abram was funded by Robert Bosch GmbH. Ivan Damgård was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 669255 (MPCPRO). Peter Scholl was supported by a starting grant from the Aarhus University Research Foundation.

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